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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
THOMAS C. MONTOYA*

INTRODUCTION
This article focuses primarily on judicial and statutory development in New
Mexico domestic relations law during the survey year.' The article is divided
into the following sections: Custody Jurisdiction, Custody and Visitation, Child
Support, Alimony, Property and Debt Division, and Children's Code.
I. CUSTODY JURISDICTION, CUSTODY AND VISITATION
A. Custody Jurisdiction
During the period surveyed, the New Mexico appellate courts decided three
3
2
custody jurisdiction cases, Elder v. Park, Trask v. Trask, and Meier v. Davig4
non. Of these cases, Elder was an initial jurisdiction case, and the others were
modification jurisdiction cases.
1. Initial Jurisdiction
Elder v. Park held that New Mexico may not assume child custody jurisdiction
during the pendency of a custody proceeding in another state if the court of that
state is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), and the New Mexico Child Custody Jurisdiction Act' (NMCCJA).' The court of appeals applied the "priority of filing
rule" and determined that if the foreign state has custody jurisdiction under its
own laws and a custody proceeding has been filed, even though process has not
8
been served, New Mexico must defer to the jurisdiction of the foreign state.
Elder also held that while an ex parte custody order entered without notice in a
foreign state may not be enforceable in New Mexico, the lack of notice does
9
not result in the loss of subject matter jurisdiction in the foreign state.
Elder concerned a child born to unwed parents in New Mexico in 1973.10 In
*Shareholder, Atkinson & Kelsey, P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico. The author wishes to acknowledge
the assistance of Keith M. Eckrich, Paralegal, and Patrick P. Fry, Esq., Atkinson & Kelsey, P.A., in the
preparation of this article.

1.
2.
3.
4.

April 1, 1986 to April 1, 1987.
104 N.M. 163, 717 P.2d 1132 (Ct. App. 1986).
104 N.M. 780, 727 P.2d 88 (Ct. App. 1986).
105 N.M. 567, 734 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1987).

5. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980).
6. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-10-1 to-24 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
7. 104 N.M. at 166, 717 P.2d at 1135.
8. Id. at 168, 717 P.2d at 1137.
9. Id. at 169, 717 P.2d at 1138.
10. Id. at 164, 717 P.2d at 1133.
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1976, the parents separated." The child lived with father in New Mexico and
saw mother regularly.' 2 In 1980, mother moved to New Hampshire.' 3 The child
visited with mother in New Hampshire during the summers of 1981, 1982, and
1983.14 By arrangement, the child remained with mother in New Hampshire
after the summer of 1983 through June 1984, but returned to New Mexico for
the Christmas holidays. 5 In June 1984, mother advised father she was going to
seek legal custody of the child.' 6 Father went to New Hampshire and brought
the child to New Mexico.' 7 Mother obtained an ex parte temporary custody order
in New Hampshire and filed an action in New Mexico to enforce the New
Hampshire order.'8 Father filed for custody in New Mexico. 9 The trial court
found that New Hampshire had jurisdiction and dismissed the New Mexico
custody petition.2" Father appealed and the appellate court affirmed. 2'
The appellate court stated that the major device by which the PKPA advances
its purposes is the home state22 requirement.23 The court held that under New
Hampshire law, New Hampshire was the child's home state, because notwithstanding visitation with the father, the child lived in New Hampshire for more
than the six consecutive statutory months immediately prior to commencement
of the New Hampshire custody proceeding. 24 The appellate court observed that
some courts have held that no case is pending in a foreign court unless the notice
requirements of the relevant custody acts have been satisfied. 25 Other courts
recognize that a court does not lose subject matter jurisdiction because it has
not yet satisfied the notice requirements imposed by the various acts.26 The New
Mexico court determined that the better rule mandates that courts should not act
in custody matters where proceedings have commenced in courts in other states
in accordance with the jurisdictional requirements of the PKPA and applicable
state law.2" Thus, New Mexico should defer to New Hampshire on the basis of
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 164-65, 717 P.2d at 1133-34.
Id.at 165, 717 P.2d at 1134.
Id.
Id.at 164, 717 P.2d at 1133.
The PKPA defines home state as:
The State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with
his parents, a parent, or a person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive
months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in which the
child lived from birth with any of such persons. Periods of temporary absence of
any of such persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4). The New Mexico definition of home state, nearly identical, is found at
N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-10-3(E).
23. 104 N.M. at 168, 717 P.2d at 1137.
24. Id.at 167, 717 P.2d at 1136.
25. Id.at 168, 717 P.2d at 1137.
26. Id.
27. Id.at 168-69, 717 P.2d at 1137-38.
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the mother's prior filing in New Hampshire." The temporary New Hampshire
order, however, was not enforceable in New Mexico because of due process
considerations and the absence of proper notice.29
The Elder decision observes the purpose and policy of the PKPA3" and the
NMCCJA. 3 Under Elder, at the initial custody determination stage, there can
be no jurisdictional competition in New Mexico with a court of another state.

2. Modification Jurisdiction
The court of appeal's decisions in Trask3 2 and Meier33 confused the issue of
custody modification jurisdiction in New Mexico. Trask and Meier involved New
Mexico modification of initial New Mexico custody determinations. Although
both cases had similar facts, the results were different. In each case, the parties
were awarded joint custody of the children at issue. In both cases the mother
was permitted to move with the children outside New Mexico while the father
remained in New Mexico and continued to exercise visitation. At the time of
the custody modification suit in Trask, the children had primarily resided with
their mother outside of New Mexico for approximately three years.34 In Meier,
the child had primarily resided with its mother outside New Mexico for approximately two years.35 In neither case was New Mexico the home state36 of
the child at the time of the proceeding. In both cases, when the mother challenged
jurisdiction, the father asserted New Mexico jurisdiction based upon the "significant connection"" provision of the NMCCJA. In Trask, the appellate court
determined that New Mexico lacked custody modification jurisdiction.38 In Meier,
the appellate court determined that New Mexico continued to have custody
modification jurisdiction.39
Certain factual distinctions exist between the cases. In Trask, although New
Mexico had home state custody jurisdiction at the time of the initial custody
determination, the children were born in Maryland and lived in New Mexico
28. id.at 169, 717 P.2d at 1138.
29. Id.at 170, 717 P.2d at 1139.
30. The main purposes of the PKPA are to promote cooperation between states respecting custody
determinations, facilitate the enforcement of custody determination of sister states, discourage continuing controversies over child custody, avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between state
courts in matters of child custody, and deter interstate abduction and other unilateral removals of
children undertaken to obtain custody awards. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, Note (quoting Pub. L. 96-611

§7(C)).
31. The purposes of the NMCCJA are similar to the purposes of the PKPA, supra note 30. N.M.
STAT. ANN § 40-10-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).

32. 104 N.M. 780, 727 P.2d 88 (Ct. App. 1986).
33. 105 N.M. 567, 734 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1987).
34. 104 N.M. at 781, 727 P.2d at 89.
35. 105 N.M. at 568, 734 P.2d at 808.
36. See supra note 22 for a definition of "home state."
37. In New Mexico there are four custody jurisdiction bases: 1)home state jurisdiction, 2)
significant connection jurisdiction, 3) emergency jurisdiction, and 4) "no other state has jurisdiction"
jurisdiction. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-10-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
38. 104 N.M. at 783, 727 P.2d at 91.
39. 105 N.M. at 571, 734 P.2d at 811.
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for less than one year before returning to Maryland.' In Meier, however, the
child lived in New Mexico for approximately four years before moving with the
mother to Oklahoma.4 Furthermore, for a period of one year after their divorce,
the parents shared joint physical custody of the child and for approximately two
years after the child and mother moved to Oklahoma, physical custody of the
child alternated every five months until the child entered school .42 After the child
attained school age, the mother had physical custody during the school year and
the father had physical custody during the summer months, the spring school
vacation and one week at Christmas.43
Custody modification jurisdiction, as contemplated by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act' (UCCJA), however, was not intended to turn on the
distinctions found in Trask and Meier. The different results in Trask and Meier
highlight a flaw in the UCCJA and create controversy in custody modification
cases which could result in increased litigation of custody jurisdiction in New
Mexico. Because of the significance of this conflict for custody jurisdiction law,
this discussion will treat it in some detail.
Two jurisdictional laws apply to a custody jurisdiction case. One is local state
law which in New Mexico, is the NMCCJA. The NMCCJA is derived nearly
verbatim from the UCCJA, which has been enacted in all states.45 The other
jurisdictional law is the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, a federal law which
is patterned on the UCCJA but which has some important distinctions, one of
which is discussed later in this article.
The flaw in the UCCJA is that the jurisdictional basis for initial custody
jurisdiction is identical to the jurisdictional basis for modification custody jurisdiction.' This equal jurisdictional treatment of initial custody and modification
custody is a change from the original "continuing jurisdiction" principle provided
in the New Mexico domestic code.47 Originally, once New Mexico assumed
custody jurisdiction, it continued that jurisdiction until it declined it in favor of
another state.48 The continuing jurisdiction under former law was exclusive.49
As stated in Meier, the concept of continuing jurisdiction in the original court
is "central to the UCCJA scheme of discouraging resort to another state to get
a new custody decree superseding an existing one." 5" Although the NMCCJA
40.
41.
42.
43.

104 N.M. at 781, 727 P.2d at 89.
105 N.M. at 568, 734 P.2d at 808.
Id.
Id.
44. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 115 (1988).
45. Id.
46. See supra note 37. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-10-3(G) provides: "'Modification decree' means
a custody decree which modifies or replaces a prior custody decree, whether made by the court
which rendered the prior decree or by another court."
47. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-7(C) provides: "The district court shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of all matters pertaining to the guardianship, care, custody, maintenance and education of the
children . . . so long as they, or any of them remain minors.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 105 N.M. at 569, 734 P.2d at 809 (quoting R. Crouch, Interstate Custody Litigation (BNA
1981) at 13).
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attempts to create continuing jurisdiction, in application, continuing jurisdiction
is lost after a child moves to another state for more than six months. 5' As it is
interpreted in the New Mexico courts, jurisdiction under the NMCCJA follows
the home state of the child. Neither the UCCJA nor federal law intended this
result.
Before the UCCJA, jurisdiction followed the child.52 Although states which
entered original custody decrees would claim exclusive continuing jurisdiction
to modify those decrees, any state where the child was present could and would
assert jurisdiction to modify a prior custody decree. The law of this period has
been characterized as that of "seize and run"; it encouraged forum shopping
and made conflicting custody decrees the order of the day. 3 The UCCJA was a
remedial law designed to eliminate this objectionable feature of the prior law by
plugging the loophole which based jurisdiction on the physical presence of the
child.'
Federal law, with respect to child custody determinations, is provided
in the PKPA.55 The name of the Act is a misnomer. In actuality, the Act is a
full faith and credit act for state child custody determinations. The PKPA provides
that every state shall enforce and not modify, except as provided in the Act, any
child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of the Act. 6
An initial child custody determination is consistent with the Act if the determination is based upon jurisdictional prerequisites which are very similar to the
jurisdictional basis of the UCCJA and the NMCCJA.57
51. See, e.g., Serna v. Salazar, 98 N.M. 648, 651 P.2d 1292 (1982).
52. See Worland v. Worland, 89 N.M. 291, 551 P.2d 981 (1976).
53. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, Initial and Continuing Jurisdiction Under The UCCJA, 14
Fam.L.Q. 203 (1981).
54. Id. at 204. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-10-4(B) and (C).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) and (d) provide:
(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a State is consistent with
the provisions of this section only
if(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and
(2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State within
six months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child
is absent from such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant or
for other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State;
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of such
state assume jurisdiction because (1) the child and his parents, or the child and
at least one contestant, have a significant connection with such State other than
mere physical presence in such State, and (11)there is available in such State
substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has been
abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because
he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse;
(D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise juris-
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There are, however, major differences between the PKPA and the UCCJA.
Under the PKPA, home state jurisdiction is given priority.58 The "significant
connection" jurisdiction basis is utilized only if there is no other state jurisdiction.59 Under New Mexico law, "significant connection jurisdiction" is an
alternative to, and on an equal footing with, "home state jurisdiction."'A second
major distinction between the federal law and the uniform law exists in the
provisions for modification jurisdiction. Under the PKPA, the initial custody
determination state retains jurisdiction to modify its decree without having to
fulfill the requirements for the initial custody determination.6t So long as the
state has custody jurisdiction under its own law and remains the residence of a
contestant (normally a parent), it continues to have modification jurisdiction.62
diction on the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best
interest of the child that such court assume jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this
section.
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody
determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as
the requirement of subsection (c)(I) of this section continues to be met and such
State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.
The New Mexico jurisdictional prerequisites are provided by N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-10-4, as follows:
A. A district court of New Mexico which is competent to decide child custody
matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial decree or
modification decree under the following circumstances if:
(I) New Mexico:
(a) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the
proceeding; or
(b) had been the child's home state within six months before commencement
of the proceeding and the child is absent from New Mexico because of his
removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons,
and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in New Mexico;
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a district court of New Mexico
assume jurisdiction because:
(a) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have
a significant connection with New Mexico; and
(b) there is available in New Mexico substantial evidence concerning the
child's present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships;
(3) the child is physically present in New Mexico and:
(a) the child has been abandoned; or
(b) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected; or
(4) it appears that:
(a) no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially
in accordance with Paragraph (I), (2) or (3) of this subsection, or another
state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that New Mexico
is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child; and
(b) it is in the best interest of the child that the New Mexico district court
assume jurisdiction.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A) and (B).
59. Id.
60. Olsen v. Olsen, 98 N.M. 644, 651 P.2d 1288 (1982).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d).
62. Id.
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Therefore, under federal law, if a state initially made a custody determination,
it would continue to have modification jurisdiction if local law permitted, even
if that state were not the home state of the child or did not have significant
connections with the child. This provision is similar to the continuing jurisdiction
feature under former New Mexico law. The continuing jurisdiction feature of
federal law, which, as Meier states, is "central to the UCCJA scheme . . . ",63
is lost in New Mexico. The test for modification jurisdiction in New Mexico is
identical to the test for initial jurisdiction.' Where, as in Trask, another state
has become the child's home state, jurisdiction will follow the child. Although
significant connection jurisdiction potentially remains in New Mexico, closer
and more significant connections with the child will always be more available
in the other state. The other state will have more substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships.
All that would remain in New Mexico would be the child's other parent, the
relatives, if any, and the physical presence of the child during visitation periods.
Furthermore, Trask specifically held that more is required than child visitation
with a resident parent in New Mexico for New Mexico to exercise modification
jurisdiction. 65
Legislative enactment of a "continuing jurisdiction" provision in the NMCCJA
could remedy this flaw. In addition, judicial interpretation of the NMCCJA which
distinguished initial from modification jurisdiction in accordance with the original
intent of the UCCJA would provide a remedy.
Professor Brigitte Bodenheimer, the reporter for the special committee which
drafted the UCCJA, interprets the language of Section 14 of the UCCJA-from
which Section 15 (the modification section) of the NMCCJA was taken - - ' in
such a manner:
1) Exclusive jurisdiction to modify an existing custody decree is reserved for
the state that rendered the decree.67 Other states must respect the exclusive
continuing jurisdiction of the prior state. 6" Continuing jurisdiction ends only if
all the parties and the child have taken up residence in other states,' or if the
state of the decree has declined to exercise its modification jurisdiction.70
2) Section 14 is the key provision which carries out the UCCIA's two objectives of (1) preventing the harm done to children by shifting them from state
63. 105 N.M. at 569, 734 P.2d at 809.
64. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-10-4(A).
65. 104 N.M. at 782, 727 P.2d at 90.
66. The modification section of the NMCCJA is Section 40-10-15. This section is concerned with
New Mexico modification of out of state custody decrees, not modification of New Mexico decrees.
Section 40-10-15 is taken from Section 14 of the UCCJA which has been adopted in every state
and the District of Columbia. Although Section 14 of the UCCJA is not directly involved in the
Trask case, a discussion of its application is necessary because Section 14 controls jurisdiction in
the foreign state to modify New Mexico's custody decree. If the foreign state does not have jurisdiction, then New Mexico retains jurisdiction. Also the analysis of Section 14 of the UCCJA is
important for a view of how New Mexico fits into the uniform scheme.
67. Bodenheimer, supra note 53, at 214.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 215.
70. Id. at 222.
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to state to relitigate custody, and (2) preventing jurisdictional conflict between
the states after a custody decree has been rendered. 7'
3) Exclusive continuing jurisdiction is not affected by the child's residence
in another state for six months or more.72 Although the new state becomes the
child's home state, significant connection jurisdiction continues in the state of
the prior decree. where the court record and other evidence exist and where one
parent or another contestant continues to reside.7 3 Only when the child and all
parties have moved away is deference to another state's continuing jurisdiction
no longer required.74
4) Due to the exclusive nature of continuing jurisdiction, the rules governing
modification jurisdiction are markedly different from the rules applicable to initial
jurisdiction."
5) Initial jurisdiction is determined primarily by Section 3 of the UCCJA
(Section 4 of the NMCCJA). 76
6) Modification jurisdiction is governed primarily by Section 14 of the UCCJA
(Section 15 of the NMCCJA). 77
7) Once a custody decree has been rendered in one state, jurisdiction is
determined by Section 14 of the UCCJA (Section 15 of the NMCCJA). 8
8) Only one state--the state of continuing jurisdiction-has power to modify
the custody decree.79 Only that state decides whether to decline the exercise of
its jurisdiction in any particular case. 0
9) There can be no concurrent jurisdiction and no jurisdictional conflict between two states.8 '
The Bodenheimer analysis was forcefully and persuasively applied in Kumar
v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 2 where the California Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, held that New York had continuing jurisdiction to modify its
custody decree as long as New York retained significant connections with the
child and exercised its jurisdiction. The decision clearly and carefully distinguished between modification jurisdiction and initial jurisdiction, and if applied
to the Trask facts, would mean New Mexico would have continued to have
jurisdiction. In Kumar, husband and wife were divorced in New York in 1974;
mother received custody of the child and father was granted visitation rights. 3
71. Id. at 214.
72. Id. at 215. Professor Bodenheimer identified "the myth of a six-month limit of continuing
jurisdiction." Bodenheimer, supra note 52, at 219-20. She criticizes the extreme view which holds
that as soon as the child acquires a new home state upon six-month residence, the state of the prior
decree loses jurisdiction altogether. Id. This misconception, she says, ignores or misinterprets Section
14 of the UCCJA. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 216.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 32 Cal. 3rd. 689, 652 P.2d. 1003, 186 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1982).
83. id. at 691, 652 P.2d. at 1004, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
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In 1979, mother took the child to California.' Approximately one and one-half
years after arriving in California, mother commenced proceedings in California
to modify the New York custody decree.85 The trial court found California had
jurisdiction because the closest contacts with the child's present and future living
environment and present and predictable development were in California and
because available witnesses were in that state.86 The court further found that the
state with the closest contacts with the child could best gauge the child's best
interests." The supreme court reversed the trial court by writ of mandate. 8
The Kumar court stated that the trial court had erroneously concluded that
California had the closest contacts with the child and it found that error determinative. 89 The court criticized the trial court's treatment of the competing
jurisdictional claims as though it were involved in an initial custody dispute with
competing concurrent jurisdiction.9' The Kumar court stated that the Commissioners' note to Section 14 of the Uniform Act 9 makes clear that New York
would lose jurisdiction in this case only if "all persons involved have moved
away or contact with the state has otherwise become slight ... "92 Quoting
from another work of Professor Bodenheimer,93 the court stated that the jurisdiction of the decreeing state continues and is exclusive as long as the noncustodial parent lives in the decree state, unless that parent loses contact with
the children, for example, by not using visitation privileges for three years.'
The Kumar court noted what Professor Bodenheimer calls the "myth of concurrent modification." 95 Under the "myth," the new state has jurisdiction as the
home state and the original state has jurisdiction because it has some connection
with the child.' A court laboring under the "myth" will then consider which
forum has greater connection with the child and will conclude that the new state
has the "closest connections."'97 The Kumar court characterized this analysis as
confused because of its failure to distinguish clearly between initial and modification jurisdiction. 98 The Kumar court stated that initial jurisdiction is determined by the guidelines of Section 3 of the UCCJA (Section 4 of the NMCCJA),
which points to the state with the closest connections to the child and with
information about the child's present and future well-being.9' Kumar explained,
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 693, 652 P.2d. at 1005, 186 Cal. Rptr. at774.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 691, 652 P.2d. at 1004, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
89. Id. at 698, 652 P.2d. at 1008, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
90. Id. at 699-700, 652 P.2d. at 1009-10, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79.
91. Id. at 698, 652 P.2d at 1008, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 777, (quoting UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICT1ON ACT, § 14, 9. U.L.A. 154 (1979)).
92. Id.
93. Bodenheimer, Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct; A Legislative Remedy For Children
Caught In The Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L.REv. 1207, 1237 (1969).
94. Kumar, 32 Cal.3d at 698, 652 P.2d at 1008-09, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 777-78.
95. Id. (citing Bodenheimer, supra note 93, at 1237).
96. Kumar, 32 Cal.3rd at 698, 652 P.2d. at 1008, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 778, n.10.
97. Id. at 699, 652 P.2d. at 1009, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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however, that modification jurisdiction is best viewed as an extension of the
recognition and enforcement provisions of the Uniform Act. '" Under Section
14 of the UCCJA, the strong presumption is that the decree state will continue
to have modification jurisdiction until it loses all or almost all connection with
the child.'o' Only if that state has lost contact must the court turn to Section 3
of the UCCJA (which is the same as Section 4 of the NMCCJA) to determine
which other state has closest contact. 0 2
In conclusion, the Kumar court held that New York had continuing jurisdiction
to modify its decree so long as the non-custodial parent continued to reside
there ' 3 and continued to assert and exercise his custody and visitation rights."
Quoting from the Commissioners' notes to the Uniform Laws,10 5 the Kumar court
stated that only if the father continued to live in state one but let mother keep
the children for several years in state two without asserting his custody rights
and without visits of the children in state one, would modification jurisdiction
of state one cease."
In Trask, the appellate court would not find that New Mexico had jurisdiction
to modify its decree on the mere fact of the child's visitation and the father's
continued residence in New Mexico. 0 7 Professor Bodenheimer, the Commissioners who drafted the Uniform Act, and the convincing analysis provided in
Kumar all demonstrate that child visitation and the continued residence of one
parent in a state is a sufficient basis for the continued exercise of modification
jurisdiction; all would reach the opposite result from the New Mexico Court of
Appeals.
The justification for the Trask decision is that for New Mexico to have modification jurisdiction, Section 4 of the NMCCJA requires a finding of one of the
' Although the NMCCJA was enacted nearly verbatim
four jurisdictional bases. 08
from the UCCJA, it is difficult to reconcile the Bodenheimer/Commissioners'/
Kumar analysis with the express wording of the significant connection basis
jurisdiction of the NMCCJA. Although visitation with the non-custodial parent
in New Mexico might be considered "significant" because of the Bodenheimer/
Commissioners'/Kumar analysis, the NMCCJA also requires that there be "substantial" evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships. '" Regardless of the frequency of visits, in most
cases the required substantial evidence will be lacking and "significant connection" jurisdiction will be lost.
A method to resolve the conflict between the Bodenheimer/Commissioners'/
Kumar analysis and Section 4 of the NMCCJA is available: The court, faced
100. Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 699, 652 P.2d. at 1009-1010, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 778-779.
Id. at 700, 652 P.2d at 1010, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
Id.
9 U.L.A. at 154-55 (1979).
32 Cal. 3rd at 700, 652 P.2d at 1010, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 779, n.14.
104 N.M. at 782, 727 P.2d at 90.
See supra note 37.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-10-4(A)(2).
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with a jurisdictional question could determine that the foreign state, under its
version of Section 14 of the UCCJA, lacks jurisdiction because of the continued
presence in New Mexico of one parent and visiting children. As a consequence,
New Mexico would continue to have modification jurisdiction. Under this theory,
because the foreign state would not have jurisdiction under its law, New Mexico
would have jurisdiction under the fourth jurisdictional basis of Section 4, which
provides that New Mexico has jurisdiction if no other state has jurisdiction. "o
B. Custody
During the survey period, New Mexico courts made three significant decisions
in the area of custody: Fitzsimmons v. Fitzsimmons,' Seeley v. Jaramillo,"2
and Alfieri v. Alfieri." 3 All these cases concerned what circumstances would
allow a court to modify a prior custody decree.
Fitzsimmons was a custody modification case decided under the prior joint
custody statute." 4 In Fitzsimmons, the trial court, after orally awarding both
parents joint legal and physical custody of the children, subsequently modified
its decision and awarded sole legal custody to the father." 5 The court found that
the mother had left the family home in Grants and was pursuing a career in
architecture in Albuquerque." 6 Wife had a close personal and sexually intimate
relationship with a paramour but the parties did not introduce evidence at trial
regarding the effect of the mother's relationship on the children.' The appellate
court reversed the award of sole custody to the father and remanded the case
for reconsideration of the custody issue."'
The appellate court decided that the mother should not be considered less
capable or less fit to be a custodial parent because of her employment or pursuit
of a career. "' The Fitzsimmons court stated that the mother's employment should
not be accorded a different or negative effect when compared with a father's
employment. 20 Since the working mother is a common and often necessary
phenomenon in our society, this condition should not reflect on the adequacy of
the mother's parenting ability."'2 The court noted that the trend in New Mexico
case law is to encourage a divorced spouse to gain economic autonomy so as to
extricate herself or himself from a position of dependency.'22 Furthermore, the
110. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-10-4(A)(4).

11. 104 N.M. 420, 722 P.2d 671 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed 104 N.M. 378, 721 P.2d 1309
(1986).
112. 104 N.M. 783, 727 P.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1986).
113. 105 N.M. 373, 733 P.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1987).
114. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9. 1.This statute was extensively rewritten by the 1986 Legislature,
1986 N.M. Laws, 824.
115. 104 N.M. at 422-23, 722 P.2d at 673-74.
116. Id. at 424, 722 P.2d at 675.
117. Id. at 426-27, 722 P.2d at 677-78.
118. Id. at 429, 722 P.2d at 680.
119. Id. at 425, 722 P.2d at 676.
120. Id. at 424, 722 P.2d at 675.
121. Id., quoting Greene v. French, 97 N.M. 493, 496, 641 P.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1982).
122. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

custody
implication that the mother was less able to manage or less deserving of 23
'
because of her employment was not in accord with the national trend.
Although the father utilized the help of the paternal grandparents to provide
24
child care services, the mother used paid child care arrangements. The appellate
court determined that the absence of maternal grandparents and the corresponding
need to utilize paid child care arrangements should not deprive an otherwise
good parent of shared physical custody. 25 Although there was evidence to show
that husband's view of wife's lifestyle, i.e., pursuit of higher education and a
career, was not in line with his view of a wife's "traditional role," there was
no evidence to show that her actions had a detrimental effect on the children. 26
Finally, the court determined that engaging in a non-marital sexual relationship
generally is not, standing alone, grounds for a change of custody, and that not
or immorality should deprive a mother of the custody
every act of indiscretion
27
of her children.'
In another custody modification case, Seeley, the court of appeals decided
that remarriage of either parent is not a sufficient reason for changing a custody
order. 21 In Seeley, the parents originally were awarded joint custody of their
child with primary physical custody placed in the father. 29 Subsequently, the
mother remarried and moved to modify custody, alleging that her remarriage
'
would provide a more stable home for the child than that provided by the father. 30
The trial court transferred primary custody of the child to the mother.' The
32
court of appeals remanded for the adoption of sufficient findings of fact.
Subsequently the trial court adopted an amended decision finding that, although
the father had cared for the child properly and adequately, the mother had
remarried and established a stable home environment, that the child was still of
tender years and that the child was of the same sex as the mother.' 33 On this
basis the trial court awarded custody to the mother. The father appealed and the
appellate court reversed. "3 The court of appeals held that, generally, remarriage
of either parent is not of itself a sufficient reason for changing an order of
custody.' 35 The court determined that the evidence indicated that essentially the
same conditions existed at the time of the modification hearing as existed at the
' The court of appeals observed that public policy favors
time of the divorce. 36
the continuation of the child custody judgments in order to promote stability and
123. Id.
124. Id. at 424-25, 722 P.2d at 675-76.
125. Id. at 425, 722 P.2d at 676.
126. Id. at 426, 722 P.2d at 677.
127. Id. at 425-26, 722 P.2d at 677-78.
128. 104 N.M. at 786, 727 P.2d at 94.
129. 104 N.M. at 784, 727 P.2d at 92.
130. Jaramillov. Jaramillo, 103 N.M. 145, 146-147, 703 P.2d 922, 923-924 (Ct. App. 1985),
appeal after remand Seely v. Jaramillo, 104 N.M. 783. 727 P.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1986).
131. 104 N.M. at 784, 727 P.2d at 92.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 785, 727 P.2d at 93.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 786, 727 P.2d at 94.
136. Id.
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continuity in the child's custodial and environmental relationships. Such judgments should only be changed upon a showing of a material change of conditions
affecting the child's interest.' 37 The appellate court determined that the fact that
the child was of tender years and was of the same sex as the mother reflected a
continuation of the status quo at the time of the entry of the original decree. '
The court noted that in the 1986 Joint Custody Act, the legislature provided that,
"in proceedings in which the custody of a child was at issue, the court should
not prefer one parent as a custodian solely because of gender." "9 Because the
evidence demonstrated that the child was happy and well-adjusted and that the
father had cared for the child properly and adequately, substantial evidence did
not support the order for a modification of custody.'"
The third important custody modification decision during the survey period,
Alfieri, involved the custodial parent's right to travel.' 4' In Alfieri, mother originally was awarded sole custody of the child, and father was granted specified
visitation rights. 42 Subsequently, the trial court expanded and again specified
father's visitation rights.' 43 Afterward, mother secretly moved from the marital
home in New Mexico to California.'M When father asked the court to modify
custody based on mother's move, the court determined that the child should
reside in New Mexico and continued custody in the mother on the condition that
she move back to New Mexico.' 45 If the mother did not return to New Mexico,
the trial court awarded the parties joint custody of the child, and placed child's
principal residence with the father. '" Mother appealed and the court of appeals
affirmed. 47
'
The appellate court observed that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the right of an individual to travel freely throughout other states or
territories is secured by the United States Constitution. ' The court recognized,
however, that where relocation is contrary to the best interests of a child, state
courts generally have upheld judicial restrictions or limitations upon removing
the child from the jurisdiction. "9 The court should not interfere with the right
of a custodial parent to relocate except where the move would be clearly contrary
to the child's welfare."' The Alfieri court stated that where the non-custodial
parent challenges the other parent's right to remove a child from the state, the
decision whether to grant the relocation is addressed to the sound discretion of
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at 787, 727 P.2d at 95.
Id. n.I.; N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-9.1(C).
104 N.M. at 786, 727 P.2d at 94.
Alfieri, 105 N.M. at 376, 733 P.2d at 7.
Id. at 375, 733 P.2d at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
105 N.M. at 374, 380, 733 P.2d at 5, i1.
Id. at 376, 733 P.2d at 7.
Id.

150. Id.
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the trial court. ' The appellate court determined that substantial evidence upheld
the trial court's determination that the move to California was not in the child's
best interests. ,52
A significant aspect of the Alfieri decision is the court's implication that a
decree which provides specified visitation rights may limit a parent's natural
right to custody, which includes the right to remove the child from this jurisdiction.' 53 The appellate court determined that the mother, as custodial parent,
could not unilaterally abrogate the father's right to specific visitation with his
daughter without court approval.'" Previously, although visitation rights were
reserved in a non-custodial parent, a custodial parent assumed a personal right
to travel and a right to travel with the child.' 55 The Alfieri decision implies that
a parent's natural rights to custody of a child are subject to visitation conditions,
which the custodial parent may not abrogate unilaterally without court approval.
The same limitation on the right to travel with the child, absent agreement or
court approval, has been codified for joint custodial parents under the new Joint
Custody Act.""
The practitioner should also consider Alfieri together with the decision in Trask
v. Trask. 5 ' Trask creates a strong argument that if a child has resided outside
New Mexico for a period of six months or more, New Mexico loses subject
matter jurisdiction to modify child custody orders with respect to that child. ,5"
Due to Trask, a non-custodial parent should initiate a custody modification suit
within six months of a custodial parent's removal of a child from New Mexico,
to maintain custody modification jurisdiction in New Mexico. In such a suit the
non-custodial parent could argue that either custody should be changed to the
New Mexico resident or that a curtailment of the visitation or periods of responsibility reserved to the New Mexico resident is not in the children's best
interest. If the non-custodial parent does not bring such a suit, the New Mexico
resident risks not only the loss of frequent association with the child, but the
loss of New Mexico custody jurisdiction altogether.
C. Visitation
Dillardv. Dillard ' presented the question of whether the district court should
suspend child support payments and place the monies in trust to coerce visitation.
In Dillard,the trial court found that mother failed to provide reasonable visitation
to father, and therefore the trial court ordered father to pay his child support
obligation into a savings account for the children's benefit until mother provided
reasonable visitation. '6
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at 379, 733 P.2d at 10.
Id. at 376, 733 P.2d at 7.
Id. at 377, 733 P.2d at 8.
Id. at 376, 733 P.2d at 7.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-9.1 (1978).
104 N.M. 780, 727 P.2d 88 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id.
104 N.M. 763, 727 P.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 764, 727 P.2d at 72.
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On appeal, the appellate court noted that withholding child support payments
as a punitive measure is not favored unless the reduction is in the overall best
interests of the children. 6 ' Similarly, withholding child support payments to
force visitation must be disfavored. 62
' The court determined that the public policy
of New Mexico provides that child support exists to benefit the children, and
that only in extreme circumstances should courts authorize the withholding of
child support to coerce visitation.' 63
1I. CHILD SUPPORT
During the survey year New Mexico courts decided five significant cases
M6
involving child support: Dillard v. Dillard,"
Hopkins v. Guin, 65 Olguin v.
Manning,"6 DeTevis v. Aragon,' 67 and White v. White.' 68 In Dillard, the trial
court ordered that father pay child support into a savings account to coerce the
mother into allowing reasonable visitation. 69 The trial court then directed that
the funds accumulated in the savings account be used to create a trust for the
post-minority education of the children. 7 0 The order provided that any money
left over after the children concluded their education or failed to attend college
would revert to father.' 7' On appeal, the court held that the district court had no
jurisdiction to provide for children who have passed the age of majority and that
the trial court acted beyond its statutory authority in establishing a child support
trust which provided for the parties' children's post-minority education.' The
appellate court determined that as a matter of policy it did not look favorably
upon an accumulation of all child support payments during the minority of the
children for the purpose of providing a college education, when during their
minority, the children are most in need of their parents' financial support."'
In Hopkins, the parties entered into an agreement defining net pay for the
purposes of determining child support payments to exclude father's disability
benefits. ' Subsequently, the trial court considered father's disability income in
assessing support. ' Father appealed, claiming the trial court abused its discretion
in its award of child support. 176
The appellate court held that the trial court could disregard the parties' agree161. Id. at 768, 727 P.2d at 76.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 104 N.M. 763, 727 P.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1986).
165. 105 N.M. 459, 734 P.2d 237 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. quashed, 105 N.M. 395, 733 P.2d 364
(1987).
166. 104 N.M. 791, 727 P.2d 556 (Ct. App. 1986).
167. 104 N.M. 793, 727 P.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1986).
168. 105 N.M. 600, 734 P.2d 1283 (Ct. App. 1987).
169. 104 N.M. at 764, 727 P.2d at 72.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. ld. at 766, 727 P.2d at 74.
173. Id.
174. 105 N.M. at 461, 734 P.2d at 239.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 462, 734 P.2d at 240.
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ment concerning the disability benefits.' 77 The parties, by agreement, could not
circumvent the mandatory statutory provisions' imposed on the court in child
support determinations. 79 Hopkins also remarked that a litigant faces a heavy
burden in challenging an award of child support on the basis of an abuse of
discretion. "
Olguin also involved consideration of the effect of a stipulation on a child
support determination.'' In Olguin, father was originally ordered to pay child
support of $150 per month for the three children.' 82 Later, father and mother
stipulated to increase support to $200 per month."'s The stipulation was signed
by the parties and filed with the court, but it was not signed by a judge."
Subsequently, when one child turned eighteen, father requested a decrease in
his child support obligation.'5 The trial court reduced support but utilized the
support provided in the stipulation, not the support provided by the order.' 86
The father then appealed, arguing that the trial court should not have accepted
the stipulation because the stipulation was not signed by the judge.'87 While
recognizing that the trial court was not bound by the parties' agreement where
the welfare of the children was concerned and so was free to reject a stipulation
of the parties in a support proceeding,' the court of appeals determined that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the parties' stipulation.' 89
The appellate court found that to set aside a stipulation of settlement usually
requires that there be a showing equivalent to that necessary to set aside a contract
in equity and that such a showing had not been made in this case." 9
The most significant child support decision during the survey period was
DeTevis v. Aragon,'9 ' which was a modification proceeding involving complex
issues of split custody (where the custody of siblings is divided between the
parents) and the effects of remarriage on support obligations. DeTevis is important
because of its illustration of the sometimes highly complex circumstances involved in a child support determination.
In DeTevis, at divorce, two children resided with father and the other child
with mother.'92 Father was ordered to pay child support to mother, but mother
177. Id. at 464, 734 P.2d at 242.
178. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-11 (1978). These provisions require the trial court to make a
specific determination and finding of the amount of support to be paid by a parent to provide properly
for the care, maintenance and education of the minor children, considering the financial resources
of the parent.
179. 105 N.M. at 464, 734 P.2d at 242.
180. Id. at 462, 734 P.2d at 240.
181. 104 N.M. at 791, 727 P.2d at 556.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 791-92, 727 P.2d at 556-57.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 792, 727 P.2d at 558.
190. Id.
191. 104 N.M. 793, 727 P.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1986).
192. Id. at 797, 727 P.2d at 562.
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was not ordered to pay child support to father.' 93 Father remarried and filed a
motion to decrease alimony and child support.'" Mother responded by filing a
motion to increase child support. 95' In discovery, mother requested financial
information from husband's new wife, who had intervened in the action. ' Over
the objection of father and new wife, who contended the information was irrelevant, the trial court ordered new wife to produce certain earned income information.' 97 After hearing, the trial court denied both father's and mother's motions
and found there had been no significant change of circumstances warranting
modification of the alimony or child support obligations of the parties."98 The
trial court ruled it would not consider the community earnings of new wife in
99
Both
determining whether father's support obligation should be modified.'
2
parties appealed. "
The court of appeals held that the legal obligation of a parent to provide child
support is not changed by virtue of the remarriage of one or both of the natural
parents, and that in the absence of adoption, the primary obligation of support
is not shifted from a parent to a step-parent.20' DeTevis stated that a subsequent
marriage by either or both of the parties may have some effect upon the financial
resources available to support and maintain children and that remarriage is one
of a number of factors to consider when acting upon a motion to modify an
award of child support.2 "2 DeTevis held that the earnings attributable to the labor
and talent of each spouse are community property; both spouses have a present
vested right to one-half of the community property derived from their marriage."
Therefore, DeTevis held a spouse has a legal obligation to use his or her community property interest, even if derived from a subsequent spouse's income,
to support his or her children.' Stated differently, DeTevis holds that an obligor
spouse is required to use one-half of the combined earning of both spouses to
support the obligor spouse's children of a prior marriage.
Although the remarriage of a parent does not in itself constitute a sufficient
change of circumstances to justify a modification of child support, DeTevis held
that it is an element to be considered.20 5 In deciding whether to modify a support
order, the trial court, in its broad discretion, should consider all of the relevant
factors and circumstances to achieve a fair balancing of the equities in light of
the best interest and welfare of the children and the financial resources of the
parents.20 6
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
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Id.
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Id.
Id. at 798, 727 P.2d at 563.
Id. at 796, 727 P.2d at 561.
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DeTevis held that since the father had directly raised an issue involving a
demand for payment of child support, it was error for the trial court to fail to
adopt a finding as to the amount of child support properly payable from the
mother to the father. 20 7 The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the father's
motion for decrease in child support and alimony. 28 The court remanded for
further proceedings in connection with wife's claim for increased child support
and for husband's motion for an award of child support.'
In the White"' case, the court of appeals emphasized that any stipulation of
the parties concerning child support is subject to court approval. The White court
held that a stipulation to use child support guidelines cannot rob the court of its
authority to set child support at an amount the court determines to be fair, even
if that amount is higher or lower than that suggested by the parties.2" '
1II. ALIMONY
During the survey year, the court of appeals decided six significant alimony
cases, which are State of New Mexico ex rel. Benzing v. Benzing,2 '2 Mitchell v.
Mitchell,2t 3 DeTevis v. Aragon,2' 4 Mattox v. Mattox,21 5 Michaluk v. Burke,2 '6 and
217
Wolcott v. Wolcott.

In Benzing,
a case of first impression, the court of appeals held that the
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act 2 19 (RURESA) may be
utilized to enforce alimony obligations. 220 The parties in Benzing, were divorced
in New Jersey in 1972 pursuant to a property settlement agreement incorporated
into a judgment.22' Wife was awarded alimony of $100 per week.222 In 1982,
husband retired with a retirement income of 40% less than before retirement.223
In 1983, husband moved to New Mexico and stopped paying alimony. 221 Wife
filed a RURESA action to enforce support, and husband requested that the trial
court terminate his alimony obligation. 225 The trial court reduced husband's
alimony obligation by 40% and ordered him to make payments on accrued
arrearage. 226 Husband appealed, arguing that RURESA only applies to child
207. Id.
208. Id. at 801, 727 P.2d at 566.
209. Id.
210. White, 105 N.M. 600, 734 P.2d 1283, (Ct. App. 1986).
211. id. at 604, 734 P.2d at 1287.
212. 104 N.M. 129, 717 P.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1986).
213. 104 N.M. 205, 719 P.2d 432 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 104 N.M. 84, 717 P.2d 60 (1986).
214. 104 N.M. 793, 727 P.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1986).
215. 105 N.M. 479, 734 P.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1987).
216. 105 N.M. 670, 735 P.2d 1176 (Ct. App. 1987).
217. 105 N.M. 608, 735 P.2d 326 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 105 N.M. 618, 735 P.2d 535 (1987).
218. Benzing, 104 N.M. at 129, 717 P.2d at 105.
219. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-6-1 to 41 (1978).
220. Benzing, 104 N.M. at 130-31, 717 P.2d at 106-7.
221. Id. at 130, 717 P.2d at 106.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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support obligations and that the court did not have jurisdiction under RURESA
to entertain the claim for alimony.227 Husband also argued that in construing the
divorce decree the trial court should have applied New Jersey law to terminate
his support
obligation because his support obligation had ended under New Jersey
228
law.
The Benzing court observed that a specific RURESA provision states duties
of support under RURESA are those imposed under the laws of the state where
the obligor is present for the period during which support is sought, so New
Mexico law applied in determining the nature and extent of the duty to be
enforced. 229 Applying New Mexico law, the Benzing court upheld the trial court's
alimony award.230
In Mitchell,3 the court of appeals determined that alimony may be justified
23 2
even though the recipient eventually receives a large amount of property.
Although Mitchell did not specify how much property wife received from division
of the community estate, the court rejected husband's claim that because of the
amount of property wife was to receive, wife was not and never was entitled to
alimony.233 The court justified a $30,000 (twenty payments of $1,500 per month)
alimony award because the trial court considered the factors supporting an alimony award, wife had not yet received her share of the property, the award
allowed her to meet her needs and pay debts (some of which were husband's
separate debts), and allowed her to get a start in her profession selling real
estate. 2 ' This holding is significant because previously, litigants often made the
claim that receipt of a large amount of property disqualified the recipient from
an alimony award.
In DeTevis,235 the court of appeals reiterated the principle that questions involving motions for modification of child support and alimony are analogous
and the same legal principles generally apply to both. DeTevis determined that
the remarriage of a husband, unaccompanied by a showing of the existence of
other relevant and material circumstances, is not sufficient to justify modification
of alimony.2 36 Remarriage, however, combined with other significant factors and
237
relevant evidence, may constitute a basis to justify modifications of alimony.
238
In Mattox, husband appealed the trial court's alimony award, arguing that
the trial court should have considered as additional income the amount wife
would receive if she were to liquidate the majority of her community property
award and invest the proceeds. 39 The court of appeals rejected that argument
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
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Id. at 131, 717 P.2d at 107.
Id.
Id. at 132, 717 P.2d at 108.
Mitchell, 104 N.M. at 214, 719 P.2d at 441.
Id. at 214, 719 P.2d at 441.
Id.
Id.
DeTevis, 104 N.M. at 799, 727 P.2d at 564.
Id. at 799, 727 P.2d at 564.
Id.
Mattox, 105 N.M. at 481, 734 P.2d at 261.
Id. at 486, 734 P.2d at 266.
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and determined that a spouse is not required to convert the majority of her
community property award into income-producing property to meet living expenses. 24' While income-producing property may normally be considered in
setting alimony, proceeds from selling the property itself should not be consid24
ered, except in such rare cases where fairness requires. '
242
In Michaluk, the court of appeals clarified the distinction between an award
of lump sum alimony and an award of periodic alimony and considered whether
an award of lump sum alimony terminates when the wife dies before she actually
receives the lump sum alimony. In Michaluk, wife was awarded $35,000 in lump
sum alimony, but she died during the pendency of the appeal and before receipt
of the alimony award.243 Husband contended that the trial court should not have
awarded lump sum alimony in this case, reserving lump sum alimony only for
cases with compelling circumstances, and that wife's right to receive the lump
sum alimony terminated upon her death.2
The court of appeals decided that the alimony statute z45 provides the district
court with the authority to award either lump sum or periodic alimony and that
the statute states no preference for one form of alimony over the other.246 The
appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
lump sum alimony to wife. In deciding whether lump sum alimony terminates
upon the death of the recipient, the court of appeals reasoned that lump sum
alimony is viewed as akin to accrued, periodic alimony.247 Because the authority
to modify an alimony decree does not include the authority to make a retroactive
modification of accrued and vested payments, once installments become due,
the right to those accrued installments of alimony becomes a fixed property
right.248 The judgment for accrued alimony, then, becomes a non-modifiable
judgment, entitled to full faith and credit in all the states.249 Therefore, although
wife died before receipt of the lump sum alimony award, her estate was entitled
to collect it.
In Wolcott,"5 the court of appeals considered whether a voluntary career change
undertaken in good faith justified modification of an alimony obligation. In
Wolcott, a settlement agreement and divorce decree ordered husband to pay $300
"
' At the time of the divorce, husband was an
per month alimony for five years. 25
Albuquerque physician specializing in obstetrics and gynecology.252 Subsequently, husband was accepted in a psychiatric residency program in Washington,
D.C.253 Husband closed his Albuquerque office and commenced his residency.2
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
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248.
249.
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254.
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Id.
Michaluk, 105 N.M. at 673, 735 P.2d at 1179.
Id. at 672-73, 735 P.2d at 1178-79.
Id. at 673, 735 P.2d at 1179.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-7 (1978).
105 N.M. at 673, 735 P.2d at 1179.
Id. at 675, 735 P.2d at 1181.
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His annual gross income was reduced to approximately one-fourth of his annual
gross income at the time of the divorce. 55 Husband unilaterally reduced his
256
alimony payments contrary to the terms of the divorce decree. Husband then
257
moved to terminate or abate alimony. The trial court denied the motions and
found that husband did not act in good faith with regard to his alimony obligation
25 8
when he voluntarily made the career change.
On appeal, husband argued that his voluntary career change justified modification of his support obligation.259 The court of appeals determined that a
voluntary career change, even though made entirely in good faith, does not
2
automatically mandate a reduction in support obligations. " The court of appeals
observed that the common trend in various jurisdictions is that a good faith career
in
change, resulting in decreased income, may constitute a material change
26
Where
"'
obligation.
support
spouse's
a
in
a
reduction
circumstances that warrants
the career change is not made in good faith, however, a reduction of a spouse's
262
support obligation will not be warranted. In this case, the trial court's finding
that husband's career change was not made in good faith was supported by the
263
evidence; the court of appeals affirmed the trial court.

IV. COMMUNITY PROPERTY & DEBTS
During the survey year, the appellate courts decided important issues concerning valuation of a professional practice in a closely-held corporation, application of full faith and credit, retirement, apportionment and reimbursement.
In Mitchell v. Mitchell,2 " the court of appeals considered whether to characterize a CPA practice as community property, and how to value such a practice,
including how to value its goodwill. In addition, the court of appeals considered
the principle of "commingling" as applied to a stock account and whether
husband was entitled to reimbursement for post-divorce expenditures on com265
munity debts which he made from community assets.
practice prior to marcommenced
and
CPA
a
In Mitchell, husband became
riage. 2' At the date of marriage, the practice owned a couch, a calculator, some
small office equipment, and generated yearly gross income of $995.267 At the
6
time of divorce, husband's practice reported a yearly income of $ 15 4 ,0269
0 0 .2
The trial court determined that the business was community property. On
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 608, 735 P.2d at 326.
Id., 735 P.2d at 328.
Id. at 608, 735 P.2d at 326.
Id. at 610, 735 P.2d at 328.
Id. at 609, 735 P.2d at 327.
Id.
Id. at 610, 735 P.2d at 328.
Mitchell, 104 N.M. at 209, 719 P.2d at 436.
Id. at 212, 214-15, 719 P.2d at 439, 441-42.
Id. at 209, 719 P.2d at 436.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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appeal, husband contended the practice was separate property because it was
acquired prior to marriage. 270
The appellate court reiterated the rule that the individual right to practice a
profession is separate property, but the value of the practice of the business at
the time of divorce is community property.27 ' The appellate court upheld the trial
court's characterization of the business as community property because husband's
investment prior to marriage was negligible; the trial court properly concluded
that the primary value of the practice was derived from husband's efforts after
marriage.272

As to the goodwill of the practice, the appellate court defined professional
goodwill as the difference between the total value of the professional association
or corporation and the aggregate value of its separable resources and property
rights, less liabilities.273Mitchell stated that when goodwill exists, an appropriate
method for determining its value is the capitalization of excess earnings method.274
The capitalization of excess earnings method views goodwill as the amount of
earnings in excess of a fair return on net tangible assets and other invested
capital. 275 Thus, Mitchell recognized that goodwill is the value of the business
in excess of its hard assets and that the value is divisible upon divorce.276 The
trial court heard expert testimony that accounting practices are valued at between
50% and 100% of the preceding year's gross fees depending on profitability and
type of work and clients. 2" The appellate court approved the trial court's use of
a capitalization factor of 100% of the annual gross fees ($154,000) to arrive at
the value of goodwill.2 7' The approved capitalization factor is important as a
starting point in valuation of an accounting practice.
The court of appeals also upheld the trial court's characterization of the stock
account as community property.279 First, the court stated that in New Mexico
there is a presumption that property acquired during marriage is community
property.28° This presumption can be overcome by a preponderance of the evi"
dence that certain property is separate property.28
' The court reasoned, however,
that if separate property has been so intermingled with community property that
it cannot be traced or identified, evidence of the property's separate status prior
to commingling is insufficient to overcome the presumption that such property,
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 210, 719 P.2d at 437.

Id.

275. BACA, FAMILY LAW IN NEW MEXICO 178, (Legal Education Institute, Inc. 1988). The formula
approach is determined by a three-step process based on Rev. Rul. 59-60: I) Determine average
earnings for at least five years, adjusting for atypical fluctuations in earnings; 2) subtract a fair return
on the tangible assets and invested capital. The rate of return depends on the risk involved; 3) The
remainder is capitalized at a rate appropriate for the degree of risk involved in the practice. This is
the value of the professional goodwill.
276. 104 N.M. at 211, 719 P.2d at 438.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 212, 719 P.2d at 439.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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282
acquired during marriage, is community property. Because the Mitchell court
agreed with the trial court's finding that the funds going into and out of the stock
account were not specifically traceable to separate or community funds or expenditures, it upheld the trial court's determination that the stock was community

property. 283

Concerning the debt issue, the trial court determined that from entry of the
of
parties' prior partial decree of divorce, until trial, husband spent $129,000
2
trial
The
property.
community
maintain
and
community assets to preserve
court reimbursed husband $129,000.215 The appellate court upheld the award,

reasoning that on the date the property was divided, the community obligations
of the community estate
had been paid with community funds and that the value
2
Mitchell court stated
The
'
divorce.
of
date
the
on
been
had
it
was the same as
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the amount of 2the
87
community estate available for distribution by the amount paid by husband.
stated that
The appellate court decision on this issue was incorrect. The facts
288
the assets
If
obligations.
community
pay
to
assets
community
used
husband
used to pay the obligations were husband's separate assets, then husband was
entitled to reimbursement. However, because the assets husband used to pay the
obligations belonged to the community, the community, not husband, should
have been reimbursed, and wife was entitled to one-half of that reimbursement.
In Willis v. Willis,2 9 the supreme court determined that a Texas divorce decree
should be granted full faith and credit when it characterized New Mexico real
2
property as husband's separate property. 1 In Willis, the parties were divorced
in Texas in 1973.291 Certain mineral, oil and gas interests in New Mexico were
2
at all times held in husband's name alone. Both parties personally appeared
293
divided all the property of the
decree
Texas
The
in the Texas proceedings.
oil and gas interests to the
mineral,
the
granted
and
located,
wherever
parties,
husband. 21 Wife filed suit in New Mexico for partition of the interests, accounting, and money due." The trial court dismissed the suit 29on the grounds
of full faith and credit, comity and res judicata; wife appealed.
The supreme court would not go behind the Texas decree to permit relitigation
of matters presented and decided in the Texas court, nor could it refuse full faith
97
and credit to foreign decrees. 2 The Willis court, however, also stated that while
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.at 215, 719
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. 104 N.M. 233,
290. Id.at 235, 719
291. Id.at 234, 719
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 235, 719

P.2d at 442.

719 P.2d 811 (1986).
P.2d at 813.
P.2d at 812.

P.2d at 813.
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the general rule is that in rem decrees which affect title to out-of-state property
ordinarily are not entitled to full faith and credit, res judicata or comity considerations, that rule did not apply to the Willis case, because, in Willis, no order
affecting the title to or requiring conveyance of the New Mexico interest was
entered in Texas. 98 The Texas decree simply confirmed husband's separate ownership of the property. As a result, New Mexico would give full faith and credit
to that decree. 2
The result in Willis is correct, but the supreme court was incorrect in its
statement that in rem decrees affecting title to out-of-state property ordinarily
are not entitled to full faith and credit. Where parties personally appear before
a state court, an in rem decree affecting title to out-of-state property is ordinarily
entitled to full faith and credit.'
In an important case, McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc.,"' the court
of appeals determined the appropriateness of a corporation dissolution action
when wife was awarded a minority interest in a close corporation at the time of
divorce and later claimed that the majority stockholders engaged in oppressive
conduct which prejudiced her interest. 3"z Additionally, the McCauley court decided what factors were appropriate for determining the value of a close corporation subject to a corporate dissolution, the value of a minority interest in a
close corporation, and whether it was error for the trial court to award wife an
interest in oil, gas and mineral rights after directing that the corporation purchase
her stock.3 3
The McCauley case is discussed in the commercial law survey article which
is published in this issue of the New Mexico Law Review." Although McCauley
was decided in a commercial law context, the practitioner should carefully review
McCauley because in reality the case involves the distribution of a community
interest in a close corporation incident to a divorce. Considerations applied by
the court of appeals to dissolve the corporation involved in the McCauley case
are identical to those which commonly occur in marital dissolution/close corporation cases. These considerations involve: 1) valuation of a close corporation;
2) valuation of a minority interest in a close corporation; and 3) options available
to the trial court in dividing a community interest in a close corporation.
In Sparks v. Caldwell,3 "5 the New Mexico Supreme Court determined whether
New Mexico had jurisdiction to award a former wife an interest in her former
husband's military retirement pay after the parties' divorce, when husband was
a Washington resident at the time of the suit. In Sparks, the parties were divorced
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. In Fenner v. Fenner, 106 N.M. 36, 738 P.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 106 N.M.
7, 738 P.2d 125 (1987), quoting Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal. 2d 322, 330, 317 P.2d 1I, 15 (1957),
which involves a similar fact pattern, the court of appeals observed that if a court has entered a
decree of specific performance, but the conveyance has not been executed, the majority of states
will give effect to the decree. Id. at 41, 738 P.2d at 913.
301. 104 N.M. 523, 724 P.2d 232 (Ct. App. 1986).
302. Id. at 524-25, 724 P.2d at 233-34.
303. Id. at 525, 724 P.2d at 234.
304. Hertz and Harmon, Commercial Law, 18 N.M.L. Rev. 2 (1988).
305. 104 N.M. 475, 723 P.2d 244 (1986).
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in New Mexico in 1971 . In 1985, the former wife filed a separate civil action
in New Mexico to declare her interest in her former husband's military retirement
pay.0 7 In 1985, husband was a resident of Washington.3 Husband was neither
a resident of nor domiciliary of New Mexico, nor did he consent to the district
the trial court's jurisdiction
court's jurisdiction.' °9 The supreme court considered
3 0
"
prohibition.
of
writ
by
matter
the
entertain
to
The supreme court construed the provisions of the Federal Uniformed Services
Former Spouse's Protection Act (FUSFSPA) "' which provides that a state district
court may divide military retired pay in accordance with state law, if it has
3 2
personal jurisdiction over the retired military member. " The jurisdictional bases
provided in FUSFSPA for division of military retirement benefits are residence
or domicile of the member within the jurisdiction or consent of the member to
have
jurisdiction." 3 The supreme court determined that New Mexico did3 not
4
jurisdiction over the former husband in Sparks and dismissed the case. " Sparks
is important, because, in its holding, the supreme court observed that the continuing jurisdiction of the divorce court did not avail the district court in the
civil action, because the court's continuing jurisdiction3 5in the divorce court
extends only to child custody and child support matters.3 6
In a second military retirement case, Reyes v. Reyes, " the court of appeals
determined that the New Mexico trial court could not divide military retirement
benefits which were not distributed in a prior Colorado divorce decree. Under
property and so are
Colorado law, military retirement benefits do not constitute
31 7
marriage.
of
dissolution
upon
division
to
not subject
In Reyes, the parties were divorced in Colorado in 1981, but the divorce
decree, which awarded alimony to wife, did not mention husband's military
retirement. 3 Husband filed the decree in New Mexico and moved to terminate
a portion of
alimony.3" 9 Wife answered and requested the court to award her
2
trial court
The
40-4-20."
Section
to
pursuant
pay
retirement
military
husband's
refused to terminate alimony and awarded wife a portion of husband's retirement. 32' Husband appealed, and the appellate court reversed the division of the
military retirement benefits.322 In its decision, the Reyes court reasoned that the
authority to modify a division of property in a prior divorce action depends on
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982).
312. 104 N.M. at 476, 723 P.2d at 245.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. 105 N.M. 383, 733 P.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1987).
317. Id.at 384, 733 P.2d at 15.
318. Id.at 383-384, 733 P.2d at 14-15.
319. Id.at 383, 733 P.2d at 14.
320. Id.at 384, 733 P.2d at 15.
321. Id.at 383, 733 P.2d at 14.
322. Id. at 383-84, 733 P.2d at 14-15.
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the law of the jurisdiction which granted the award.323 In Colorado, military
retirement benefits do not constitute property and are not subject to division upon
dissolution of marriage.324 Since the trial court had to follow Colorado's substantive law, the court was without authority to award wife part of husband's
military benefits.32
In a third military retirement case, White v. White,326 the court of appeals
determined that the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act
(FUSFSPA)327 does not necessarily prohibit a trial court division of gross retirement pay. FUSFSPA provides that a court may treat disposable retired pay
as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with state law. 32 "Disposable" retired pay is gross pay less statutorily specified deductions, including
federal and state tax liability, life insurance, disability retirement and certain
allotments. 3" Husband contended that FUSFSPA limits a state court division of
retirement benefits to disposable pay, rather than gross pay. 3" The trial court
agreed with husband and divided only the husband's disposable, or net pay,
33
rather than his gross retirement pay. 1
The appellate court determined that the statutory deductions were, with the
exception of withholding tax, under the direct or indirect control of the retiree
and might vary significantly amongst retirees.332 The White court determined that
FUSFSPA was not intended and did not operate to affect characterization of
retired pay, and that such characterization is a state law question.333 White stated
that FUSFSPA primarily establishes a scheme to permit an ex-spouse to enforce
or garnish retirement pay while also affording the retiree protection limiting the
amount "garnished" in enforcement of state court orders.334 Because the characterization of retirement pay is a state law question, the division of gross, rather
than disposable military retirement pay is not inconsistent with FUSFSPA.333
The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for a division of husband's
gross military retirement benefits. 336 The appellate court remarked that a trial
court was not foreclosed from authorizing appropriate deductions when the failure
to do so would work an injustice or would be inequitable.1 31
The consequence of the White division is that although state courts may divide
gross military retirement benefits as between the parties, enforcement of that
division is nonetheless limited by FUSFSPA to that part of the retirement pay
which is defined as "disposable." Therefore, if there is a discrepancy between
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id. at 384, 733 P.2d at 15.
Id.
Id.
105 N.M. 600, 734 P.2d 1283 (Ct. App. 1987).
10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) and (d) (1982).
105 N.M. at 603, 734 P.2d at 1286.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 603-04, 734 P.2d at 1286-87.
Id. at 604, 734 P.2d at 1287.
Id.
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the amount of retirement pay awarded to a non-military spouse under New Mexico
law, and the amount that can be enforced under FUSFSPA, the non-military
spouse will be required to find other sources to satisfy the disparity.
In a fourth important retirement case, the appellate court, in Mattox v. Mat338
reviewed a trial court's division of retirement benefits using a present
tox,
value or lump sum method as well as the trial court's decision to disregard the
tax consequences incident to a division of community property. Although the
New Mexico Supreme Court has determined in Schweitzer v. Burch,3 3 that,
absent agreement, the trial court must divide community property retirement
benefits on a "pay as it comes in" basis, Mattox is instructive for the implication
it holds for retirement division law.
In Mattox, husband acquired an interest in his retirement plan during twentythree years of marriage. 340At the time of the divorce, the pension had not matured,
i.e., husband was not eligible to retire for two more years, when husband would
be age fifty-three. 3"' The trial court based its valuation of the pension on the
assumption that husband would not cash it in and that he would retire on the
date when he would be eligible to retire, which was when he had worked twentyfive years and was age fifty-three. 42 Husband argued that the trial court should
have valued his pension as if he would have retired at age sixty-five. 33 Husband
also argued that the pension should be valued as if it were cashed in as of the
date of trial, a date which was two years before he was eligible to-retire. 3 " The
appellate court rejected both arguments stating that the trial court properly valued
husband's pension benefit using the earliest date it matured, taking into account
monetary contributions and current pension entitlement accrued during marriage
and based upon husband's current salary." 5
The Mattox court determined that under current New Mexico case law a spouse
is entitled to a community share of the portion of the pension that is vested but
unmatured at the date of divorce. ' In valuing unmatured pension benefits for
the purpose of lump sum distribution, the trial court is required to determine
their present value.M 7 Answering husband's contention that the trial court should
have used age sixty-five as his retirement age in valuing the pension, the Mattox
court determined that a spouse could not unilaterally choose to postpone retirement when pension benefits are fully vested and matured so as to impair a nonemployee spouse's interest in those retirement benefits. 48 In valuing the pension,
the trial349court's use of the date when husband was first eligible to retire was
proper.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

105 N.M. 479, 734 P.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1987).
103 N.M. 612, 711 P.2d 889 (1985).
105 N.M. at 480, 734 P.2d at 260.
Id. at 483, 734 P.2d at 263.
Id. at 482-83, 734 P.2d at 262-63.
id. at 483, 734 P.2d at 263.
Id. at 482-83, 734 P.2d at 262-63.
Id.
Id. at 481, 734 P.2d at 261.
Id.
Id. at 483, 734 P.2d 263.
Id. at 482-83, 734 P.23d at 262-63.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

The court of appeals also upheld the trial court's assumption that husband
would work to age fifty-three when the pension matured. Prohibiting the community from using future employment years in valuing the pension would come
dangerously close to defeating the community interest of the non-employee
spouse to the pension benefits. ° Thus, under Mattox, a pension plan matures
when the employee is eligible to retire and is entitled to receive the benefits
earned through the years."'
Mattox raises the question of how to apply its holding to a case where the
trial court divides retirement benefits on a "pay as it comes in basis." 352 Once
pension benefits have matured and an employee spouse is eligible to retire but
chooses not to retire, is the non-employee spouse entitled to receive from the
employee spouse a sum equivalent to that which the non-employee spouse would
have received if the employee spouse had retired? This question has not been
directly answered by the New Mexico courts but was answered in the affirmative
by a California court in In Re Marriageof Gillmore. "' In its decision the Mattox
court relied upon Gillmore for the proposition that one spouse cannot, by invoking
a condition wholly within his control, defeat the interest of the other spouse.354
Carrying this proposition to its logical conclusion would require the New Mexico
court to follow the California court in holding that once pension rights have
matured and an employee spouse is eligible to retire, but chooses not to, the
employee spouse must pay the non-employee spouse the amount of benefits
which the non-employee spouse would have received if the employee spouse
had retired.
Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision not to consider
the tax consequences of the property division in Mattox s5 The Mattox court
stated that although the general rule requires that the trial court consider tax
consequences when deciding a property settlement upon dissolution of marriage, 35 6 such tax consequences should only be considered if they are immediate
and specific.35 Mattox stated that requiring the trial court to consider tax consequences in light of numerous unknown factors, such as when an asset will be
sold, the price of the asset upon sale, or the tax laws and tax rates at the time
of the sale, would be unreasonable.358 Where tax consequences are too speculative, it is proper for the trial court to disregard them. 59
The appellate court decided a significant apportionment case in Dorbin v.
Dorbin.3 6 Dorbin clarified the concept of apportionment 36' under New Mexico
350. Id. at 482, 734 P.2d at 262.
351. Id.
352. Schweitzer v. Burch, 103 N.M. 612, 711 P.2d 889 (1985); supra text accompanying note
339.
353. 29 Cal.3d 418, 629 P.2d 1, 174 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1981).
354. 105 N.M. at 484, 734 P.2d at 264.
355. Id. at 485, 734 P.2d at 265.
356. Id. at 485, 734 P.2d at 265.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. 105 N.M. 263, 731 P.2d 959 (Ct. App. 1986).
361. "Apportionment is the principle courts apply when an asset is acquired during marriage,
using both separate and community monies. At divorce, the asset is apportioned between separate
and community interests in a manner which achieves substantial justice." Id. at 265, 731 P.2d at
961.
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law. The appellate court also decided the circumstances under which reimbursement is authorized for community funds spent for the benefit of separate property,
or for separate funds spent for the benefit of community property.
During the parties' marriage, in Dorbin, wife purchased a town house for62
property.1
$69,000, making a cash down payment of $10,000 from her separate
3
The balance of $59,000 was financed by a real estate contract. Wife took title
to the town house in her name alone as her separate property, with husband's
paid $3,000 in prinknowledge and consent.' During the marriage, the parties
3 65
cipal on the real estate contract and $24,156 in interest. At the time of trial
the town house was worth $100,000 with an equity value of $44,000. " The
trial court awarded the community a lien of $27,156 against the town house,
367
representing $24,156 in interest and $3,000 in principal.
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision that the
community was allowed to recover both principal and interest paid during the
36
marriage on wife's separate residence. ' The appellate court, however, did not
on apportionment which had allowed the
law
Mexico
New
rigidly follow prior
community a lien for mortgage payments made with community money, but only
9
to the extent that mortgage principal was reduced. Instead, Dorbin extended
only a sum equal to the
not
prior New Mexico law by granting the community
portion of appreciation
a
to
equal
sum
a
also
but
reduction,
mortgage
principal
equity. 370 The Dorbin court approved an apportionment formula utilized by the
California Supreme Court which related appreciation equity to the principal
payments made by the community to determine the total amount of the community
372
lien. 37 1 The court supplied a graphic formula to illustrate the process. In applying the formula, the appreciation equity is first apportioned according to the
ratio by which the respective community and separate funds were used to pay
the principal on the original purchase price. The cash equity is then apportioned
according to the separate or community source of funds used to pay the purchase
price. Finally, the total equity is divided by combining the respective community
373
and separate property shares of the cash equity and appreciation equity. The
Dorbin court emphasized the method it used is an approved method, but also
37 4
recognized other appropriate apportionment formulas which it distinguished.
either
to
The Dorbin court also clarified when reimbursement will be allowed
the community or the owner of separate property. Dorbin held that when community money is spent to benefit separate property, without the acquisition of
insurance,
an asset, for example, when money is paid for interest, taxes and
375
neither New Mexico statute nor case law authorizes reimbursement. Similarly,
362.
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364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
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Id. at 264, 731 P.2d at 960.
Id. at 267, 731 P.2d at 963.
Id. at 266, 731 P.2d at 962; Chance v. Kitchell, 99 N.M. 443, 659 P.2d 895 (1983).
105 N.M. at 267, 731 P.2d at 963.
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Id. at 267, 731 P.2d at 963.
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when separate money is spent for the benefit of the community, but no asset is
acquired, for example, if separate money is spent for food, clothing, travel, etc.,
reimbursement is not authorized.376 On the other hand, reimbursement is authorized, via apportionment, when an asset is acquired with community and
separate monies.377 The Dorbin court concluded that it is sound policy to only
allow reimbursement or apportionment when an asset is acquired because to do
otherwise would invite litigation for accountings between spouses to determine
who paid for the most insignificant thing. 37 8 The Dorbincourt remanded the case
to the district court to apportion the interest in wife's residence according to the
formula in the opinion.379
CHILDREN'S CODE
Three important principles were decided by the court of appeals in three cases
arising under the Children's Code. In the first, In re Reuben & Elizabeth 0. v.
Department of Human Services,3 ° the court of appeals upheld a trial court's
termination of parental rights. In doing so, the court emphasized that in such an
action the court may not balance the backgrounds of the parties to determine
which party might provide a preferable environment for the child but, instead,
must apply the specific factors provided in the Children's Code for termination
of parental rights."'
In State v. Julia S.,382 the court of appeals clarified when a child may be
subject to punishment for contempt under the Children's Code.383 In its decision,
the Julia court distinguished between a "child in need of supervision" (CHINS)"
and delinquent385 children and discussed the policy of the law as it affects each
classification. In holding that a CHINS child may be subject to punishment for
contempt under the Children's Code, the appellate court approved the specific
statutory requirements which must be met before a CHINS child may be incarcerated.386 The appellate court, however, disapproved of the use of the general,
inherent contempt powers of the district court other than as provided in the
Children's Code.387

In Matter ofAngela R.,388 the court of appeals decided that child hearsay may
be permitted in a sexual abuse case. Furthermore, not only may parents or medical
experts report such hearsay, but also social workers and others may do so.389
376.
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379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 270, 731 P.2d at 965.
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104 N.M. 222, 719 P.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1986).
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CONCLUSION
The number and variety of issues decided by the New Mexico appellate courts
in the domestic relations area demonstrate the complex and comprehensive issues
facing the judiciary, the bar, and litigants. The domestic relations litigation
explosion is due not only to the increased number of litigants, but also to the
increased number of issues which are litigated. It is not uncommon for a limited
divorce case to involve a large number of issues. Due to the development of
family courts, which limit their attention to domestic relations issues, and the
careful consideration given to domestic relations matters by the appellate courts,
the judicial system has recognized the specialization and unique handling which
domestic relations cases require. The attention given by the appellate courts to
family law cases during the survey year demonstrates the seriousness with which
the judicial process regards domestic relations matters. Although the courts cannot prevent dissolution, they are able to ameliorate its harsh effects.

